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Unfortunately, the Indiana decisions are found listed among the small
group holding to the minority of these viewpoints, 16 partially due of course
to the use in our decisions of the rule discussed in the early part of this
note, but in an annotation to the principal case,'- the American Law Reports
cite three recent cases which still follow such reasoning as compared with
forty-three recent cases which are placed within the rules set out here as to
promises made without present intent to perform. It is submitted that this
jurisdiction need not have considered itself so bound by previous decisions
as to prevent its reaching a more just and desirable result. H. A. A.
Workmen's Compensation-Who Is an "Employee" Under the Act.-
This was an appeal from an award made by the majority of the full Indus-
trial Board of Indiana. From an award denying compensation to appellant
for the death of her husband, the appellant appealed to the Appellate Court
of Indiana. The case was submitted on an agreed statement of facts, which
showed that at the time of his death, decedent had the title of vice-president
of appellee, Dusenberg, Incorporated, then under the control of the Auburn
Automobile Company. The services the decedent rendered appellee con-
sisted solely of carrying on appellee's engineering and experimental work,
of which he was in charge, and of drawing plans of automobiles and motors,
as well as often supervising and aiding in their construction. For these
services decedent was paid a yearly compensation of $15,000. Decedent
also owned a small portion of the stock of appellee, but was at all times
under the direction and control of superior officers, so that even his hiring
and discharge of the engineers working under him was subject to approval.
While driving a car, belonging to appellee and under appellee's orders,
decedent met with the accident which resulted in his death. The only ques-
tion in dispute was whether decedent was an employee of the appellee within
the meanings of the statute. Held, decedent was not an "employee" within
the meaning of the Workmen's Compensation Act.'
The question of who is an "employee" under the Workmen's Compensa-
tion Act is a perplexing problem. In the instant case, there were two judges
dissenting; one so strongly that a separate dissenting opinion has appeared.2
To analyse the problem of the principal case successfully it is first necessary
to examine the general provisions of the statute as well as the general rules
of law applicable to such provisions, both in Indiana and neighboring states
before dealing with the specific cases referred to in the majority opinion.
The Workmen's Compensation Act providing for compensation to be
paid employees by employers for personal injury or death by accident arising
out of or in the course of employment, also 3 provides that unless the context
otherwise requires, "The term 'employee' as used in this act shall be con-
strued to include every person, including a minor, in the service of another,
under any contract of hire or apprenticeship, written or implied, except one
whose employment is both casual and not in the usual course of the trade,
business, occupation or profession of the employer." 4
The Act, thus includes employees in all industrial pursuits, except those
expressly exempted, 5 namely, casual laborers, farm or agricultural employees
16 12 R. C. L. 262, 51 A. L. R. 78.
17 91 A. L. R. 1297.
1 Duesenberg v. Duesenberg, Inc. (1933), 187 N. E. 750 (Ind. App.).
2 Duesenberg v. Duesenberg, Inc. (1934), 190 N. E. 894 (Ind. App.).
3 Baldwin's Ind. Stat. (1934), Sec. 16378.
4 Baldwin's Ind. Stat. (1934), Sec. 16449 (b).
5 In re Boyer (1917), 65 Ind. App. 408, 117 N. E. 507.
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and domestic servants.6 There has been no express legislative distinction
drawn between classes of employees; neither has there been any exemption,
express or implied, made of officers, directors, stockholders of corporations,
or of persons in employment similar to that of decedent in the principal case.
Furthermore, there is authority that the definition of "employee" in the act
should be liberally construed.7
In Illinois, the court has held that a stockholder and director of a corpo-
ration who held office of secretary and treasurer was an "employee" within
the meaning of the act.8 The court said, "The only circumstance which has
any tendency to distinguish this from the ordinary case of employer and
employee or master and servant is the fact that Stevens was a stockholder
and director and held the office of secretary and treasurer of the corporation.
Section 5 of the Workmen's Compensation Act declares that, 'The term
employee as used in this act, shall be construed to mean: * * * Second.
Every person in the service of another under any contract of hire, express
or implied, oral or written.' Stevens was included within the terms of this
definition. The act applies automatically not only to the corporation, but to
all its employees, regardless of the kind of work in which they may be
engaged." It can- readily be seen that this construction put upon the word
"employee" in an act essentially identical with the Indiana act, differs widely
from the reasoning of the Appellate Court in the principal case.
The Michigan court has evidenced approval of 'the same type of reason-
ing followed by the Illinois court, saying that, "The mere fact that back of
his employment he was a stockholder of the company and acted as its presi-
dent could not alter the character of his employment. Neither his' status
as a stockholder nor his position as president obligated him in any way to
perform the work of an employee."9  The court of Massachusetts also has
held, in a case where the claimant was a stockholder and treasurer of the
corporation, that every person in the service of another under any contract
of hire, express or implied, oral or written is an "employee" under the
Workmen's Compensation Act,' 0 and that one is in "service" of another if
bound to submit to the will and direction of the other."'
The Tennessee court has held, under the Tennessee act in which "em-
ployee" includes every person in the service of the employer, that where
claimant was a stockholder, director, and secretary-treasurer of the company
and was killed while supervising the operation of the plant, he was an
"employee," indicating that the ordinary meaning of those words should
not be narrowed or expanded by judicial action.12
The Wisconsin court in Milwaukee Toy Co. v. Industrial Commission 13
said that while it was, of course, fundamental that to entitle an injured person
or dependents of a deceased person to compensation under the terms of the
act the relation of employer and employee must exist, still the fundamental
question was whether such person was performing service for another
under a contract of hire. And that if the alleged employer is a corporation
and the alleged employee has a controlling interest in it, the extent of his
holdings and the manner in which he exerts his powers of control may be
factors of some force in determining whether the alleged employee is in
6 Baldwin's Ind. Stat. (1934), Sec. 16385.
7 Hurst v. Hunley (1933), 81 Ind. App. 203, 141 N. E. 650.
8 Stevens v. Industrial Commission (1931), 346 Ill. 495, 179 N. E. 102, 81 A. L. R.638.
9 Dewey v. Dewey Fuel Co. (1920), 210 Mich. 370, 178 N. W. 36.
10 Emery's Case (1930), 271 Mass. 46, 170 N. E. 839.
11 Cameron v. State Theatre Co. (1926), 256 Mass. 466, 152 N. E. 880. -
12 Alsup v. Murfreesboro Ice Cream Co. (1933), 56 S. W. (2nd) 746 (Tenn.).
'3 (1931), 203 Wis. 493, 234 N. W. 748.
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reality an employee of another, but that standing alone, this is a little
consequence.
The New York courts have held that one who owned a majority of stock
in a corporation, acting as its president, while also assisting in various tasks
of manual labor, was not an "employee";14 but they have also held that
where one who was vice-president of a corporation, was employed through
the board of directors and owned only a small portion of the stock, receiving
a weekly wage and doing work other than under his official capacity, he
could properly be classed as an "employee."' 15 However, the applicability
of these New York decisions to Indiana cases is somewhat nullified by the
fact that the section defining "employee" '1 6 differs widely from the Indiana
act.
The case most cited and most heavily relied on by the Appellate Court in
the principal case is In re Raynes, 17 an Indiana case. This case attempted
to formulate a general concept of the word "employee" and decided that it
denoted one "whose remuneration is popularly designated as wages rather
than salary; whose compensation for service is not munificent; * * *
whose labor is manual, or of a like degree of industrial or commercial im-
portance as manual labor when viewed from the standpoint of individual
accomplishment." But the court went on to point out that, "We should not
be understood as indicating that any of these tests are decisive, or that one
whose earnings are designated as salary, * * * or whose wage is mate-
rially more than $24 per week, or whose labor is other than manual, is not
entitled to compensation under the act." The court further said, "It appears
to us as sound that compensation under ,Vorkmen's Compensation Acts can-
not be denied one simply because he happens to be president or other
executive or managing officer of the corporation that employs him and that
that fact alone is not sufficient to eliminate him from among those regarded
as employees within the meaning of such acts." It surely cannot be argued
that an engineer, draftsman, chemist or any one engaged in experimental
work for another is not an "employee" simply because his work is not
manual and his salary or wage for his skilled services is large. Moreover,
the Indiana Workmen's Compensation Act does not exclude from its bene-
fits one whose remuneration exceeds any specified amount; less than half a
dozen of the compensation acts in the United States impose such a limita-
tion. 18
The other cases relied on by the court in its solution of the present
problem were Manfield & Firman Co. v. Manfield19 and Holycross & Nye v.
Nye. 20 Neither of these cases is in point simply because in both cases the
claimant owned so large a controlling interest in the defendant company as
to be practically the owner. This was not true in the principal case, the
decedent owning but a small portion of the stock. In spite of his title of
"vice-president," the decedent was not in control of the corporation in any
sense of the word.
14 Bowne v. S. W. Bowne Co. (1917), 221 N. Y. 28, 116 N. E. 364.
15 Beckmann v. Oelerick (1916), 174 App. Div. 353, 160 N. Y. S. 791.
16 Laws 1914, C. 41, Sec. 3, Subd. 4. The New York Act defines "employee" as
"a person who is engaged in a hazardous employment in the service of an employer,
carrying on or conducting the same upon the premises or at the plant, or in the course
of his employment away from the plant of his employer; and shall not include farm
laborers or domestic servants."
17 (1917), 66 Ind. App. 321, 118 N. E. 387.
18 Schneider, Workmen's Compensation Law (1932, 2d ed.). Vol. 1, Sec. 34, p. 268.
19 (1932), 95 Ind. App. 70, 182 N. E. 539.
20 (1933), 186 N. E. 915.
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The Workmen's Compensation Act itself makes clear the construction to
be put upon the word "employee." Nowhere in the act are there any such
qualifications mentioned as "manual labor," "munificent compensation,"
"wages rather than salary." As Judge Dudine in his dissenting opinion
so aptly points out, "The context of the act is consistent and reasonable
without a different construction of the word 'employee.' The Legislature
not having written into the act any provisions for the exclusion of said
groups of employees as beneficiaries thereof, this court is not authorized
to read such provisions into the act." 2 ' A recent case decided by the Supreme
Court of Indiana is authority for the caution to be exercised in adding
qualifying or limiting words to the express provisions of a statute.2 2 There
was no necessity in the'principal case, in light of the facts, for any such
sweeping restrictions being read into the act as were approved by the
Appellate Court.
It is also interesting to note that the court based its decision entirely
upon the three Indiana cases herein examined, having no other authority
for its proposition. Likewise, in the original Indiana case, In re Raynes, 23
the court relied almost entirely upon New York decisions, the inapplicability
of which has already received comment.
The Appellate Court also attached much weight to the method of com-
putation of insurance carriers in determining the basis for their rates for
compensation insurance. How the basis on which the insurance company
computes its premium rate for such insurance is of any controlling im-
portance in the question of the meaning of "employee" other than to work
an estoppel against the insurance company, is indeed obscure.
R. S. O.
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Indiana Annotations to Restatement of Law of Contracts. By Hugh E. Willis.
(American Law Institute Publishers, 1934, pp. 232.)
Admirable as it is, the work of the American Law Institute in the various
sections of the Restatement would be of comparatively little value to the
profession and, especially to the Bench and Bar, if it were not supplemented
by complete and accurate annotations of "the appellate decisions of the re-
spective states. The committee of the Indiana State Bar Association in
charge of the Annotations to the Restatement of the Law of Contracts
was fortunate in securing the consent of Professor Hugh E. Willis of the
Indiana University Law School to take the responsibility for the preparation
of the Indiana Annotations. Professor Willis in his preface acknowledges
able assistance from several, who were students of the Law School, namely:
Charles F. Brewer, J. Bertram Ewer, Harold N. Fields, William Henry
Husselman, Alvin Charles Johnson, Samuel Kauffman, Paul Warren Marrs,
Leon Harry Wallace and Phillip C. Richman. In the opinion of the reviewer,
each member of the profession, teacher, student and practitioner, who aided
in this work, is to be congratulated for having made" a substantial contribution
to the working tools of the profession.
.Every reported Indiana case was examined for judicial decision and
declaration on the law of contracts, and yet the result of this exhaustive
21 Duesenberg v. Duesenberg, Inc. (1934), 190 N. E. 894 (Ind. App.).
22 Citizens' Trust & Savings Bank v. Fletcher American Co. (1934), 190 N. E.
868 (Ind. App.).
23 (1917), 66 Ind. App. 321. 118 N. F. 387.
